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6.1  Introduction 
Although the threat of  “new protectionism” has arisen with reference 
to a whole range of  industrial activities in the Western countries and 
although there is a tendency to consider all such threats as part of  a 
general political-economic phenomenon to be attributed to factors such 
as generalized unemployment, increased demands for job security from 
the state, etc., it is useful to distinguish between two extreme, idealized 
situations. 
On the one hand, the pressure of  import competition, no matter how 
significant, can be seen as being addressed to industries undergoing a 
basic shift in comparative advantage, not because of  technological ad- 
vances arising in different parts of  the world which are not being shared 
by  competing nations, but  rather  because of  shifts in  labor costs or 
because  “learning  by  doing” by  latecomers is altering the traditional 
competitive edge of  industries in the West. These are the “senescent,” 
“declining” industries such as textiles, and shoes and footwear which are 
labor-intensive and mostly unintensive in skills and R & D, where the 
newly industrializing countries of the South are increasingly demonstrat- 
ing comparative advantage. Since these industries are characterized by 
low technical progress-which  is perfectly compatible with increasing 
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capital intensity, of  course-Schumpeterian  responses in the nature of 
induced technical progress 2  la Weiszacre-Kennedy-Samuelson are not in 
evidence. Hence the responses of  the enterpreneurs, labor, and com- 
munities or townships in which these industries are located, as well as the 
nature of the governmental policy options and responses, are likely to be 
quite different from those occurring when the industries are of the type 
considered immediately below. 
This second class of industries is at the other end of the technological 
scale, being largely characterized by  changing comparative advantage 
because R & D leads to technical change that gives the competitive edge 
to new countries. These industries are at the front end of the dynamic, 
Schumpeterian capitalist process.  The resulting shifts in  comparative 
advantage yield a very different set of responses by the industries losing 
comparative advantage, and the policy options available to the countries 
where they are located are also correspondingly different. 
In considering these two idealized models, it will be critical to note that 
the response to shifting comparative advantage will involve differential 
interaction with international “factor” mobility. In the former case, a 
possible and indeed empirically important response (hitherto neglected 
altogether in the literature) is lobbying for a greater inflow of  foreign 
labor. In the latter case, however, among the important responses are a 
variety of patterns of  direct foreign investment: for example, the use of 
threats of protection to induce a reverse flow of foreign investment into 
the country or mutually penetrating investments in differential but simi- 
lar products where the different countries have differential advantages. 
Moreover, it will be useful to distinguish the following “actors” among 
the lobbies seeking governmental response to the shift in comparative 
advantage: (i) the entrepreneurs, who may be interested in sales B  la 
Burnham and Galbraith but are generally identified in the formal argu- 
ments below with the owners of equity capital in the industry; (ii) labor, 
distinguished in practice by nationality, skills, and age but again treated 
in the formal  analysis below  as  a homogeneous entity; and  (iii) the 
community-cum-township where the affected industry may play a domi- 
nant role. The analysis will try to identify which policy responses will be 
sought by one or more of these actors and therefore what political forces 
the government is likely to confront by  choosing one policy response 
option in preference to another. 
6.2  Technically Unprogressive, “Traditional”  Industries 
Since technical change is not important in these industries, the shift in 
their comparative advantage largely reflects changing factor endowments 
andor  learning in the newly industrializing countries. They are thus also 
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less developed countries (LDCs). How are these industries in the de- 
veloped countries likely to react to the adversely shifting comparative 
advantage? 
6.2.1  The Relaxation of  Immigration Quotas 
as a Policy Response Option 
As comparative advantage shifts against these unprogressive indus- 
tries, pressuring them toward a (relative or absolute) contraction of their 
output, it might appear that all the potential lobbies that were distin- 
guished above--entrepreneurs,  labor, and the community-would  be 
seeking relief via only one type of governmental response, namely, some 
sort of  protection.  However, this is plainly not  the case.  For  these 
unprogressive  industries  are  often  at  a  comparative  disadvantage 
precisely because cost conditions have moved against them, and in la- 
bor-intensive industries this is often because labor abroad has become 
relatively cheaper. Now, introduce into this picture the fact that interna- 
tional mobility of labor is severely regulated by immigration quotas and 
that the real wages of  labor are substantially higher in the West than in 
many developing countries. It follows immediately that one additional 
policy response in which entrepreneurs could be interested is for the 
government to increase the availability of  imported labor. 
Note that the entrepreneurs’ response will typically not include in this 
case their leaving for the foreign countries where the comparative advan- 
tage has shifted. This is due to the fact that these are unprogressive 
industries where, with no Hymer-like firm-specific know-how to take 
advantage of, the migration of  domestic entrepreneurship is likely to 
mean  merely that the migrant entrepreneurs will have to operate in 
unfamiliar, relatively riskier foreign situations, without any offsetting 
technological advantage, and hence at a competitive disadvantage with 
local producers. 
On the other hand, domestic labor should find its own interests better 
served by a policy of  protection rather than by the alternative policy of 
relaxed immigration quotas. Therefore, while a governmental response 
in the form of  allowing the increased importation of  foreign labor will 
satisfy entrepreneurs, it will  not generally satisfy domestic labor. To 
consider these issues rigorously, turn now to the formal analysis below. 
6.2.2  Some Formal Models 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model 
Take first the 2 x 2 x 2 model of  trade theory to develop the main 
implications of  our policy-choice  problem rigorously. Assume two goods 
X  and Y,  and two factors K and L, and let Y be L-intensive and the 
importable good, in conformity with the empirical reality of the problem 156  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
at hand. I would like to distinguish between the two types of  shift in 
comparative advantage that may affect the L-intensive importable indus- 
try Y:  (1) that which arises externally-ither  from a shift in the foreign 
offer curve facing our country or from a tariff cut by our country as in the 
across-the-board tariff cuts of  the Kennedy Round; and (2) that which 
results internally, e.g., from capital accumulation or productivity change. 
In each case, it will also be relevant whether the comparisons between the 
two policies involve a tariff-free or a tariff-ridden economy when the 
policy chosen is to import more labor. Throughout, I assume a small 
country and negligible lobbying costs. 
Case I: External shift in comparative advantage, zero initial tariff. Figure 
6.1 shows the  economy moving from  external price  ratio  PI to P2, 
adversely affecting production of  good Y. 
The tariff policy will then restore production of Y to the initial level Yo 
at Q,  but, as seen in figure 6.2, will yield welfare U,.  The alternative policy 
of restoring Y production to Yo  by importing labor, on the other hand, 
will lead to welfare level U,,  as follows. As labor is imported, holding the 
goods price ratio unaltered at its new free-trade position P2,  we can trace 
the Rybczynski line Q2R  which, at Q3,  yields Y production equal to Yo. 
Importation of  the corresponding amount of  labor (Lm)  would then 
restore domestic importable output to the initial, preshift level. But the 
national welfare level, defined exclusive of  imported  labor’s welfare, 
would be U,,,  with the national budget line Q2C’,,  since imported labor 
earns the value of  its marginal product, which, in turn, equals the incre- 
ment in output along the Rybczynski line. 
A comparison of  the two policies, both achieving identical production 
in the importable industry and thus satisfying entrepreneurs equally in 
that respect ,’ then shows that the policy of  reduced restrictions on the 
importation of labor dominates that of increasing trade protection insofar 
as economic welfare conventionally defined is concerned (U,,  > U,),  and 
hence should be the preferred option of  an economic-welfare-oriented 
g~vernment.~  At the same time, from the viewpoint of  international 
relations, it should again be a preferred option, since relaxing immigra- 
tion restrictions gives the government good marks whereas increasing 
trade protection gives it bad marks. On the other hand, at Q3  and Q2 
under the policy of  reduced immigration restrictions, the real wages of 
labor  are  less  than  at  Q, under  the tariff  policy,  A  la  the  Stolper- 
Sarnuelson arg~ment.~ 
The choice between the policy option of reducing immigration restric- 
tions and increasing trade protection in response to an adverse shift in 
comparative advantage therefore primarily involves the conflicting in- 
terests of the government (or, more precisely, that part of  the government 
[e.g., in the United States, the executive rather than the legislative]  which 157  Shifting Advantage, Protectionist Demands, and Policy Response 
GOODY  f 







B  GOOD  X- 
(K  -  intensive) 
is presumably  interested  in  welfare  as defined by  conventional  eco- 
nomics) and consumers, who face lower prices for importables, on the 
one hand, and domestic labor, on the other hand, while leaving the 
entrepreneurs somewhat indifferent between the two policy options in- 
sofar as industry output is concerned but in favor of the policy of import- 
ing more foreign labor since this implies greater reward to capital. I shall 
later amplify other aspects of  the conflicting interests involved in the 
choice between these policies, especially those involved at the commu- 
nity-cum-township level, which cannot be accommodated in the present 
model. For the present, however, let me go on to show that this basic 
pattern of  conflicts between the different sectors resurrects itself when 
the external shift is in the presence of a trade restriction, though there are 
important differences to note, as argued immediately below. 
Case II:  External shift in comparative advantage, positive initial tar# 
The presence of  an initial tariff  makes a significant difference to the 
analysis of the effects of different policy responses to an external shift in 
comparative advantage. This is  because  the policy  of  increasing the 
importation of  labor is itself to be judged in the context of a tariff-ridden 
economy. For the choice now, when the external price ratio shifts from PI 
to P2,  is between increasing the tariff to restore production of  Y to Yo  at 
Q, and, instead, increasing the importation of labor to achieve Yo  while 
maintaining the tariff at the initial level. 
While in case I, with zero initial tariff, the importation of labor left the 
national welfare unchanged at the free-trade level (since imported labor 
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international prices thanks to free trade), the importation of labor when 
the labor-intensive importable industry is protected by  a tariff is neces- 
sarily immiserizing! This result, derived by Uzawa (1969) and Brecher 
and Alejandro (1977) independently of one another, is seen in figure 6.3. 
There, after the shift of  the external price ratio to P2, the continuing 
initial tariff makes @ the new tariff-inclusive domestic price ratio. With 
labor imported, the corresponding Rybczynski line is then Q2R.  Now, if 
no labor were imported, the equilibrium consumption would be at C2, 
which lies on P2 and on the income-consumption line IC (PF)  which is 
drawn with reference to price ratio P?.  If, however, labor is imported 
and is paid the value of  its marginal product at domestic tariff-inclusive 
prices, the national income at domestic prices will be identical to Pf 
through Q2.  Thus, if  labor importation takes production on the Rybc- 
zynski line to Q3,  and  (for simplicity) we  assume that foreign labor 
consumes entirely  in  the  country  of  residence, the national  (net-of- 
foreign-labor-consumption)  bundle  of  production  will  be  along  the 
stretch EF on the national income line Pf through Q2.  And, by putting 
the new international price line P2 through E and F,  and cutting IC (Pf  ), 
we see that the resulting national consumption will lie in the range of 
Cim  CLm.  Evidently therefore importing labor will necessarily be immis- 




0  8  GOOD4 
Fig. 6.3 
However, it is equally evident that the alternative policy of resorting to 
trade protection to restore Yproduction to Yo by shifting back to Q,,  with 
the new international price ratio P2, yields consumption at C,  on the 
income-consumption curve IC (Pf  ) which is drawn with reference to Pp 
(tangent to AB at  Q,). Evidently this is inferior to any equilibrium 
consumption, on Cim  C'&,  reached under the labor importation policy. 
Note  therefore  that the welfare loss from  importing labor is con- 
strained so as to make the labor-importing policy nonetheless a better 160  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
alternative than the trade protection p01icy.~  This means that the basic 
nature of  the conflicting interests of  the different actors, as emerging 
from case I, survives the complication of an initial tariff while weakening 
the economic-welfare advantage that the government would derive from 
a policy of  importing labor. 
Case  III:  Domestic shift in comparative advantage, zero initial tariff. Nor 
does a shift in comparative advantage resulting from either domestic 
factor supply or technical change affect the basic nature of the conflicting 
interests on the two policy options being considered. 
Thus take figure 6.4, where a domestic shift of the production possibil- 
ity curve from AB to A’B’ leads to a strong decline in the “production 
advantage” of good Y  at identical goods price ratios, the production of 
good Y actually declines, as at Q2 compared with  The international 
goods price ratio remains unchanged at PI.  It should be manifest to the 
reader now that a labor-importing policy will lead to consumption along 
QzPl at price ratio P1, whereas an alternative policy of  protection  to 
retain output of  Y at Yo  will lead to production at Q4 and consumption 
not  merely on the inferior  budget  line  Q4P1,  but  also on a further 
distorted price-ratio tangent at Q4 to A’B’. 
Case IV:  Domestic shift in comparative advantage, positive initial tariff. 
The case where the domestic shift in comparative advantage occurs in the 
presence of a tariff does not need to be spelled out, since it modifies the 
argument of  case I11 in much the same way as case I1 modifies case I: it 
weakens the economic-welfare  case for importing labor while leaving it as 
the preferred option to trade protection. 
The analysis in the 2 x 2 x 2 model therefore underlines the robustness 
of  the conclusion that, while entrepreneurs will marginally prefer the 
importation of  more foreign labor to an increase in protection  when 
comparative advantage shifts against their industry, the policy option of 
increasing the influx of foreign labor will be preferred by consumers and 
by  that branch of  the government (if  any) which concerns itself  with 
economic welfare conventionally defined, while being considered detri- 
mental to its interests by  domestic labor. 
However, I might add that cases I11 and IV, where the shift is domesti- 
cally induced, suggests an important difference from cases I and 11, where 
the shift is externally induced. In the former case, if the shift results from 
capital accumulation leading to a decline in the output of  the labor- 
intensive importable activity (a la Rybczynski), the real wages of  labor 
will be maintained; it is just that the “drawing power” of the importable 
activity for domestic labor has been reduced as a result of  the change in 
the accumulation. In this case, it is not likely that domestic labor will 
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supportive of the output of the labor-intensive industry without coming at 
the expense of  domestic wages. (Of  course, the protection option will 
increase the real wages of  labor; but this is unlikely to make the same 
impression on labor  as  actually losing ground  through  reduced  real 
wages). In cases where the shift in comparative advantage is external, 
however, the loss of real wages in the present model is necessarily actual, 
not just in an opportunity-cost sense, when the shift occurs; and therefore 
the importation of  labor  as a policy option is likely to be  opposed 
passionately. 
Jones-Neary Model 
Consider instead the model of Jones (1971) and Neary (1978) in which 
capital is specific but labor is mobile between the two sectors. This may be 
considered to be the “short-run” version of  the standard 2 X 2 model, if 
labor is assumed to be mobile in the short-run but capital is  not, an 
interpretation given by Neary (1978), Mussa (1974), and Mayer (1974).’ 
What happens to the choice between labor importation and protection in 162  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
this model when the terms of  trade shift adversely against the labor- 
intensive importable activity?8 
The effect of the shift in the terms of trade is now an unambiguous fall 
in the rental on capital in the labor-intensive importable industry while 
the return to labor (after reallocation) will rise in terms of the importable 
but fall in terms of  the exportable good. (If  the importable sector is 
“small,” then evidently the real wages of  labor are likely to fall, as the 
weight of  the exportable good in consumption will be greater). In this 
model, therefore, both capitalists and labor are likely to have the incen- 
tive to lobby for protection. But capitalists may also settle for increased 
importation of labor. For as Mayer (1974) has shown, such an increment 
in labor, at a constant goods price ratio, will increase the rental unam- 
biguously  to  capital  in  both  sectors  while  the  real  wages  fall 
unambiguously.g 
Insofar as economic welfare is concerned, the choice is again clear-cut 
in the Jones-Neary model, as long as an otherwise free-trade situation 
without distortions is considered. Thus the protection option implies the 
standard cost of  distorted production and consumption. However, with 
the real wages declining as labor is imported, the importation of  a finite 
quantity of  foreign labor yields a “surplus” to the host country: labor 
importation is therefore welfare-improving. Thus that branch of govern- 
ment that responds to an economic-welfare motivation will favor labor 
importation over instituting a protective tariff. 
Industry-specific Foreign Labor Paid a Differential Wage 
The preceding two models considered foreign labor to be industry- 
nonspecific and equally assumed that the return to foreign and domestic 
labor was equal. However, approximating the West European gastarbei- 
ter system more closely, we may assume that foreign labor is imported on 
an industry-specific contractual basis and can be effectively paid lower 
wages than domestic labor. 
Take this model then  and assume a Haberler-Brecher model with 
Haberler (1950)-type sector-specific  factors and Brecher (1974a, b)-type 
sticky real wages for labor. Let Q,  be the initial production vector, AQIB 
being the production possibility curve, given the immobility of  factors. 
When the terms of  trade shift from PI to P2,  turning against the import- 
able, labor-intensive good Y,  labor in Y production insists on maintaining 
its real wages in terms of good X.  This leads to workers being laid off in 
industry Y until the marginal physical product of  labor in Y rises suf- 
ficiently at Q2 to restore Y labor’s real wages in terms of  good X. 
In this situation, if the Y capitalists are allowed to import foreign labor 
to restore their output to Q,, and foreign labor allows itself to be hired at 
lower real  wages than  what  local labor insists on, then  part  of  the 
incremental output of good Y (this increment being Q2Ql) will accrue to 163  Shifting Advantage, Protectionist Demands, and Policy Response 
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the capitalists, as demonstrated in figure 6.6. There, 0s  represents the 
real wages of  domestic labor in terms of  Y  at Q2 in figure 6.5; OZ is the 
lower, fixed real wages at which foreign labor can be imported in numbers 
permitted by the immigration quota; OJ is the immigration quota; SHR is 
the marginal product curve for imported labor in industry Y, given the 
employment of  domestic capital and labor at Q2 in figure 6.5. The total 
increment in Y output that results is then SHJO, which is assumed to 
correspond to Q2Ql in figure 6.5. But of  this increment, only OZHJ 
accrues as earnings of foreign workers, and the rest, SHZ,  accrues to the 
domestic capitalists; this division corresponds to Q3Ql for foreign work- 
ers and Q2Q3 for domestic capital in figure 6.5. Thus, reverting to figure 
6.5, national welfare is now defined, in the labor-importation option, by 
the availability line P2 passing through Q3. 
By contrast, the protection option will maintain domestic labor’s real 
wages while restoring labor employment as well; it will also increase 164  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
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capitalist earnings, but this increase cannot be rank-ordered with the 
increase under the labor-importation option; and economic welfare may 
be above or below that at Q3  (the labor-importation option) since protec- 
tion will mean that production will be restored to Q,  but there will be a 
consumption-distortion cost which may be large enough to outweigh the 
production gain vis-A-vis the labor-importation option.'O 
6.2.3  Likely Lobbying Outcomes 
What type of  lobbying may then be expected in the labor-intensive 
industries, once we recognize the possibility of using immigration quotas 
as a policy instrument? Evidently the answer depends critically on the 
production-cum-trade model that applies to a specific situation; it is also 
clearly dependent on the precise immigration control system that the 
country operates. Thus, if  we contrast the results of the three models, it is 165  Shifting Advantage, Protectionist  Demands, and Policy Response 
interesting that, in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, capi- 
talists would find protection harmful and labor importation of no effect 
on their earnings whereas in  the other two models both options are 
helpful. Again, labor is actually hurt by labor importation in the Jones- 
Neary model but is neither hurt nor helped in the other models, whereas 
protection helps it in all three models. The precise conflicts of interests, 
reflecting the implications of  the two policy options of  protection and 
labor importation, will therefore depend on the specifics of the situation 
concerning factor-market and immigration-system behavior. No general 
conclusions are possible, as indicated by table 6.1,  which categorizes the 
outcomes. 
On the other hand, the models uniformly suggest that entrepreneurs 
have an interest in getting governments to agree to relax immigration 
quotas, that governments themselves have a potential interest  in the 
relaxation  of  immigration  quotas since economic welfare is such an 
important objective, and that labor, in contrast, has a relatively greater 
interest in the adoption of protection measures instead. I would therefore 
expect governments to expedite the inflow of foreign labor whenever (a) 
domestic labor’s opposition to this policy option is weak and its lobbying 
for protection is correspondingly weak (as when labor is not effectively 
organized due to geographical dispersion of  the industry, for example), 
(b)  the government’s ability to grant protection is weak (because, for 
example, of fear of retaliation or respect for GAlT  Article XIX), and (c) 
the government’s ability to augment  immigration is not  constrained 
greatly by the social consequences of  increased immigration. More spe- 
cifically, the following types of hypotheses may well be worth exploring. 
1. When the shift in comparative advantage is domestically induced 
(as in cases I11  and IV of  the HOS model above), the opposition of 
domestic labor to the importation of  labor will be the less, for reasons 
spelled out earlier. By  contrast, when the shift comes from external 
changes (as in cases I and II), the opposition of  domestic labor to the 
importation of labor will be the greater. Therefore I would expect that 
the policy response to a shift in comparative advantage would be, ceteris 
paribus, greater for imported labor when the shift is domestic rather than 
external. 
2.  Moreover, where the external shift in comparative advantage is 
combined with the presence of  a  native labor force which  has low- 
mobility characteristics (e.g., higher age, residency traditionally in towns 
or communities in which the roots and ties are strong, which raises the 
nonpecuniary costs of mobility), the likelihood of protection emerging as 
the outcome of the lobbying response will be all the greater. For in this 
case, the option of  importing foreign labor will appear particularly un- 
attractive to the low-mobility labor, whose real wages will otherwise face 
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Note:  The comparison is with the situation where import competition (i.e., shift in comparative advantage) occurs and there is no policy response. The 
comparison is not therefore with the situation before import competition 
*The entries here relate, in the Jones-Neary  and Haberler-Brecher models, to capitalist earnings in the importable industry. 167  Shifting Advantage, Protectionist Demands, and Policy Response 
force in cases where labor has strong historical ties to an area, as in 
traditional “textile towns,” may also be very important quite indepen- 
dently of  the labor force itself. For where such geographical specificity is 
involved, other jobs are likely to be seen as being dependent not merely 
on the size of  the industry’s output but also on traditional  spending 
patterns, and imported labor, with its usual high savings and remittance 
rates, is unlikely to be quite an adequate replacement in that regard! 
Moreover,  the social cohesion of  the community itself  may  militate 
against  introducing  a  sizable  foreign  labor  component  into  such 
communities.” 
What type of  evidence would indicate that such hypotheses make 
empirical sense? The foregoing arguments suggest that one may be able 
to examine episodes such as the response to across-the-board tariff cuts in 
the Kennedy Round and hypothesize a set of  testable propositions. 
I would expect, for example, that when across-the-board tariff cuts are 
made, as after the Kennedy Round, the tariff-cut exemptions (adjusted 
insofar as they were offset by domestic subsidies-as  they were often, and 
in varying degree, in West Germany according to Riedell977) would be 
generally greater in those traditional industries where the labor force is 
largely domestic, is geographically concentrated in close-knit communi- 
ties, or is relatively immobile. In contrast, when quota restrictions are 
relaxed, I would expect there to be a relatively greater growth of  the 
foreign labor component in those industries in which the labor force 
already has a significant foreign element, is geographically dispersed, or 
has a domestic component that is relatively skilled and mobile. 
Furthermore, if  cross-sectional regressions were run, I would not be 
surprised if  (the subsidy-adjusted) tariff-cut exemptions were inversely 
related to the initial proportion of foreign labor in the total labor force 
and to the skill level of  the labor force, and positively related to the 
average age of the labor force, as seems to be indicated to some degree in 
Cheh’s (1974) analysis of  the United States and Riedel’s (1977) analysis 
of  West Germany. And this is the important new possibility: that the 
growth rate of  foreign labor (absolute or relative to domestic labor) in 
these industries, reflecting the relaxation of  immigration quota restric- 
tions, may be positively related to the initial proportion of foreign labor 
in the total labor force and to the skill level of  the labor force, and 
inversely related to the average age of  the labor force. And thus, also, 
there may then exist an inverse correlation between the tariff-cut exemp- 
tions an industry receives and the growth rate of its foreign labor force, in 
cross-sectional analysis. 
6.2.4  Labor Lobbying and the Efficient Tariff: An Aside 
Where the labor interest in protection is deep-seated, the foregoing 
arguments suggest that the governmental response will be to yield to 168  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
protectionist pressures from the labor lobby; the relaxation of immigra- 
tion quota restrictions will not be the preferred option. 
In these cases, the “bargaining” between the government and labor 
may be visualized as being over the degree of protection to be granted to 
the industry when the comparative advantage has shifted, with labor’s 
primary interest consisting  in fully restoring its preshift economic position 
and the government’s in minimizing the cost of such restoration of labor’s 
economic position. 
Viewing  the  conflict this  way,  we  can  develop  the  notion  of  an 
“efficient tariff’ (as is done rigorously by  Feenstra and Bhagwati in 
chapter 9), once we recognize that the levy of a tariff will generally raise 
revenue. Thus, consider for simplicity the 2 x 2 x 2 model where labor’s 
real wage declines with the relative price of  the importable good. A shift 
in comparative advantage improving the terms of  trade will hurt labor, 
triggering the lobbying for a tariff. If then the tariff is used for restoring 
the real wages of  labor, there will  be an associated loss of  welfare to 
society. However, since the tariff raises revenue, we may consider the 
following alternative.  Suppose that this tariff revenue itself is used to 
compensate labor through a direct subsidy such that labor’s real income 
(defined as the sum of its real wages in employment and this subsidy, as in 
Bhagwati 1959) is equivalent to its preshift real wages. Then the resulting 
welfare cost to society would generally be lower. Thus a tariff which 
restores the real wuges of labor to their original level would generally be 
inferior to the efficient tariff which is chosen so as to minimize the welfare 
cost of  a tariff which restores labor’s real income to the original (real 
wage) level by additionally utilizing the tariff revenue proceeds to subsi- 
dize labor’s income.I2  This notion of the efficient tariff makes a good deal 
of  sense insofar as the revenue used for redistribution is being generated 
as a side effect of the protection itself and is not being raised ab initio for 
the redistribution!” 
What this notion of  the efficient tariff does therefore is to provide a 
rationale for a direct subsidy to lobbying labor, as long as it is kept within 
the bounds  of  the  tariff  revenue  raised  from  the  partial  protection 
granted, when  the labor  lobby seeking protection  is  strong and the 
government feels that there is no political alternative to maintaining the 
labor lobby’s economic position in face of  a shift in comparative advan- 
tage. 
6.2.5  Protectionist Response to Import Competition and the 
Welfare of  the Exporting Country: Some Paradoxes 
While the foregoing analysis was addressed to lobbies, policy options, 
and likely outcomes, focusing exclusively on the country facing import 
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an interesting, and surely important, element of paradox into the situa- 
tion regarding protectionist responses to import competition as far as the 
welfare of  the other trading countries is concerned. 
For it is no longer possible to identify the levying of protective tariffs on 
one's  exports by  another country  as necessarily welfare-worsening- 
short of  standard paradoxes in trade theory-for  the simple reason that 
the protection also redounds to the welfare of  foreign labor, and this 
labor may very well be one's own emigrant labor. Thus, if  the United 
States levies protective tariffs on Mexican textile exports, this will worsen 
the welfare of  the Mexican nonemigrant population  but, since some 
Mexican labor is employed in textiles production in the United States, it 
will also improve the welfare of  the Mexican emigrant population. So, 
depending on what distributional welfare weights are assigned, one could 
easily argue that United States protection improves the welfare of  the 
Mexicans (emigrants plus none migrant^)!'^ Interestingly, this paradox is 
the mirror image of the paradox (analyzed in Bhagwati and Tironi 1980, 
Bhagwati and Brecher 1980 and Brecher and Bhagwati 1981) in which the 
reduction of  a tariff in the presence of foreign-owned factors of  produc- 
tion may be accompanied by a decline in national welfare even though the 
country is small and no other domestic distortions are pre~ent.'~ 
Another interesting paradox that arises in the presence of foreign labor 
from LDCs and the DCs (developed countries) is that the country from 
which foreign labor is coming and the country producing the imports may 
not coincide. Thus textiles in the United States may be using Mexican 
labor while they face competition from South Korea. Hence there may be 
inter-LDC  conflicts inherent in the decision of  the DCs to use or not to 
use  protection  in  the face of  a shift  in  comparative  advantage.  For 
instance, West Germany uses a great deal of  Turkish, Yugoslav, and 
Greek labor in industries that face competition from the less developed 
newly  industrializing countries such as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore. 
6.3  Technically Progressive, Schumpeterian Industries 
The scenarios concerning lobbying and policy response options dis- 
cussed in the preceding section change dramatically as attention is shifted 
to technologically progressive industries. These industries might be de- 
scribed as Schumpeterian since they represent the essence of the dynamic 
capitalist system that Schumpeter described so beautifully. Technological 
change, resulting from R & D (whether private or public), is critical to the 
shifts in comparative advantage in these industries, and this essential fact 
fundamentally transforms the nature of the lobbying  responses and policy 
options that open up in the face of  the ongoing shifts in comparative 
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6.3.1  Two Alternative Models of  Direct Foreign 
Investment in Progressive Industries 
It will be appropriate to distinguish in the analysis that follows between 
two  models in  the direct  investment  literature,  both  an  offshoot of 
Hymer’s (1960) ground-breaking work on direct foreign investment: the 
“product cycle” (PC) model of Vernon (1966) and the “mutual penetra- 
tion of  investment”  (MPI) model set forth in my  review of  Vernon’s 
Sovereignty at  Bay  (Bhagwati 1972) and then  amplified in  Bhagwati 
(1978, 1979). 
The “Product Cycle” Model 
In the PC model, firms develop R & D-based  new products in one 
country, with a corresponding conferral of  comparative advantage of 
manufacture in that country. As long as the product and its associated 
processes need to be “debugged” and simplified, the location of produc- 
tion at home, close to the R & D facilities, is important. With the passing 
of this stage, the production of the products is freed from this locational 
requirement and production facilities will shift to wherever wages are 
cheapest. Thus this model is premised on a shift in comparative advan- 
tage in the location of  production  that reflects a process where R & 
D-created comparative advantage self-destructs and the process is essen- 
tially a result of domestic R & D rather than a result of external changes 
induced by R & D. 
The “Mutual Penetration of  Investment” Model 
In contrast, the MPI model is based on the observation that competi- 
tion occurs among differentiated but similar products and that increased 
competition can typically occur in the progressive industries through R & 
D-induced  intensification of  the advantages enjoyed by the competitors 
for their differentiated products. For example, European and Japanese 
small cars compete with American large cars; and this competition inten- 
sifies with time as the Japanese get better at the game (e.g., Toyota 
started production only after World War 11) of  R & D in production, 
marketing, and sales and the Americans get steadily better at producing 
the “gas guzzlers.” The MPI thesis then is that the response to such 
intensified competition could be a mutual investment by the competing 
firms in  one another’s R  & D-induced  advantages.  Contrasting  the 
resulting MPI pattern of  direct investment and Vernon’s PC model, I 
wrote the following in 1972: 
There is also at least one more dramatic form of international invest- 
ment which neither Vernon nor other researchers in the MNC field has 
noted but which may well be the pattern to emerge as a dominant form. 
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products via R&D, export them and then transit to producing them 
abroad, there is an alternative “model”  where MNC’s in different 
countries have R&D-induced advantages in producing different types 
of sub-products (e.g. one MNC in Japan is excellent with small cars and 
one MNC in U.S. has an edge on large cars; or tire firms in different 
types of tires). In competing in each other’s home countries or in third 
markets in both types of  sub-products, it is natural that each MNC 
would find it difficult to compete effectively with the other in sub- 
products where it does not have the edge. I would expect that, in this 
situation, there is likelihood of  these MNC’s deciding that mutual 
equity inter-penetration, with productionwise accommodation in sub- 
product specialization according to the advantage possessed, is profit- 
able.  Thus, the MNC in  U.S.  (say,  GM) that  finds it  difficult to 
compete in the small-car field with the MNC in Japan (say, Toyota) 
that finds it difficult to compete with the MNC in U.S. in the large-car 
field, would each decide that the best strategy if  you cannot compete 
with comfort is to follow the policy: “if  you cannot beat them, buy 
them.” Thus GM would want to buy equity in Toyota for the small car 
production and Toyota in GM for the large-car production: and GM in 
U.S. would go off spending resources in producing and improving its 
own small cars while Toyota in Japan would similarly hold back on its 
own large-car efforts. One thus gets mutually interpenetrating MNC’s 
within industries, with accompanying division of  labour and a novel 
form of  “cartelisation” which goes by sub-products. Linder has made 
us familiar with trade in commodities between similar countries as 
consisting of  sub-product exchanges: and Hymer and Rowthorn have 
noted that MNC’s from different countries penetrate into each other’s 
countries. My  “model” essentially combines these two and predicts 
that MNC‘s with R&D-induced  specialization in different types of 
sub-products within an industry in different countries will interpene- 
trate. 
I then noted that the MPI model was perfectly illustrated by an account 
in  Forbe’s magazine of  15 November  1970 (p. 22)  of  the following 
“international marriage”: 
Long the friendliest of competitors. Dunlop and Pirelli neatly comple- 
ment each other. Dunlop is primarily a manufacturer of  conventional 
cross-ply tires. Pirelli concentrates on radials. In Europe, Dunlop has 
perhaps 18% of the market, Pirelli 12%, as against 12% for Michelin, 
the next largest competitor. In Europe, Pirelli crosses Dunlop’s path 
only in West Germany: Elsewhere, where Dunlop is active, Pirelli 
stays out; where Pirelli is active, Dunlop stays out. Outside of Europe, 
Pirelli is active mostly in Latin America. Dunlop in the Commonwealth 
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The two  companies have even diversified into different  areas- 
Dunlop into sporting goods and precision engineering products, Pirelli 
into paper, electronics and cables. 
Eventually, of  course, both marketing organizations will work as 
one, with Dunlop pushing Pirelli products where Dunlop is strong, and 
Pirelli pushing Dunlop products  elsewhere.  “The greatest  benefits 
should come from a pooling of R&D, however,” explains J. Campbell 
Fraser, a Dunlop director: “In the ’seventies  and ’eighties,  competition 
will be more and more in terms of innovations. In the U.K. we have a 
home base of  about 55 million people-that  isn’t big enough for the 
kind of  R&D we’ll need. Pirelli has an even smaller home base, about 
45 million. By merging, we’ll have a home base of  100 million, enough 
for the kind of  R&D we’ll need around the world. . . . There will not 
even be any exchange of  public shares. Instead each will  acquire an 
interest in the other’s operating subsidiaries. The British and Italian 
companies will operate on their own. 
The report went on to note (p. 23) that there will  be four companies: 
Dunlop Home (the United Kingdom and Europe) with Dunlop owning 
51 percent and Pirelli 49 percent; Dunlop International (the rest of  the 
world) with Dunlop holding 60  percent  and Pirelli Milan and Pirelli 
Switzerland 20 percent each; Pirelli Milan (the Common Market) with 
Pirelli Milan holding 51 percent and 49 percent; and Pirelli Switzerland 
(all other Pirelli operations) with Dunlop holding 40  percent,  Pirelli 
Milan 20 percent, and Pirelli Switzerland 40 percent. 
6.3.2  Shifting Comparative Advantage, Lobbying, and 
Policy Response Options: Three Patterns 
The preceding review of  major models of  direct foreign investment 
evidently bears directly on the questions being addressed in the present 
paper: namely, what kind of lobbying responses can one expect, and what 
options are open for governmental response, when a shift in comparative 
advantage occurs in technically progressive industries? For one can now 
think of three idealized patterns: (i) the “product  cycle” scenario, where 
the shift in comparative advantage occurs from the emergence of cheaper 
factor costs abroad overtaking the relative cheapness of domestic produc- 
tion  due to the proximity to R & D facilities once the new product 
processes are simplified and debugged; (ii) the “mutual penetration of 
investment” scenario, where international competition is among similar 
products and technical change intensifies competition among them with- 
out conferring a dominant advantage to one class of products (and hence 
firms and nations) as against another; and (iii) the “growing  dominance of 
externalproducts” scenario, where, as in the MPI case, there is interna- 
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even a shift in demand, as in the case of  the shift in demand away from 
“gas guzzlers” toward small cars and hence in favor of non-American car 
makers,  who  have  traditionally  specialized in small cars) favors the 
external producers and represents a growing, adverse shift in compara- 
tive advantage. 
The first two patterns evidently include, as possible responses to the 
shift in comparative advantage, the corresponding patterns  of  direct 
foreign investment,  i.e., the outward migration of  entrepreneurs and 
firms. The last pattern, on the other hand, opens up a more complex set of 
responses. 
The “Product Cycle” Scenario 
In this case, the shift in comparative advantage toward producing 
abroad  and the subsequent transfer  of  production  abroad essentially 
reflect entrepreneurial decision making. Besides, the direct foreign in- 
vestment response is consistent with governmental interest insofar as it 
represents  an  economic-welfare-improving move  (unless  there  are 
domestic or foreign distortions present). 
The lobbying response is therefore to be expected from domestic labor 
insofar as labor feels that it is “losing jobs” as a result of this response by 
the entrepreneurs.  l6 Again, therefore, the actors likely to be involved in 
the lobbying process, in response to the shift of  production abroad as 
comparative advantage shifts abroad, are likely to be labor lobbies. 
However, the policy instruments that the labor lobby can turn to are 
not identical to those in the case of the “traditional” industries. Thus, if 
the market for the product shifts mainly overseas before the production 
shift overseas takes place, as in some of the PC folklore, then protecting 
domestic production evidently does not help! Rather, labor would have 
to ask for a subsidy on production or trade, neither of which is likely to 
appeal very much to the government because of  its budgetary implica- 
tions and because it opens up the possibility of  countervailing action 
under GATT rules. An obvious alternative instrument which labor is 
likely to seek therefore is the imposition of restrictions on foreign invest- 
ment-which  is indeed what labor unions in the United States have 
occasionally done. Together with this route, one can also expect the 
unions and labor lobbies to attempt to make such direct foreign invest- 
ment less attractive by complaining that the practices resulting in cheaper 
costs abroad are in violation of  GATT and other standards, and thus 
require the imposition of countervailing duties, a procedure which again 
can help only insofar as the domestic (as against the overseas) market is 
still of some importance for  the  product.  Again, this option is  also 
occasionally exercised, as in the frequent complaints about the exploita- 
tion of child labor abroad in violation of International Labour Organiza- 
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abroad, about special concessionary treatment of profits made by foreign 
firms, etc. 
Given, therefore, the nature of the shift in comparative advantage to 
produce  abroad, the  lobbying game reduces  in  the present  instance 
essentially to one between the government and the entrepreneurs, on one 
hand,  and  labor lobbies, on the other. But  instead  of  the lobbying 
essentially focusing on trade protection, it is likely to focus primarily on 
the need for controls on investment abroad except in cases where the 
domestic market still accounts for a major fraction of total sales. Such a 
situation therefore contrasts with the case of  “traditional” industries, 
where the tariff is a more effective instrument  for protecting labor’s 
economic interests. Here, the question of controlling foreign investment 
by the domestic entrepreneurs is a meaningless option; entrepreneurs in 
these industries do not seek to respond by out-migration since they do not 
have Hymer-type know-how that would make it economical to do so, as 
already noted in section 6.2. 
But it is pertinent to ask whether the importation of foreign labor is not 
an option that entrepreneurs would seek as an alternative to investing 
abroad when the product is standardized and debugged and cheap foreign 
labor becomes correspondingly decisive. It must be admitted that the 
failure to consider this option altogether is a major weakness of  the PC 
doctrine, which has focused wholly on the choice between producing at 
home with local factors and producing abroad with foreign factors. This 
omission does make sense when immigration quotas are taken as exoge- 
nously specified, but it does not when firms can seek to have the quotas 
liberalized in response to a shift in comparative advantage. Eschewing 
formal analysis of a firm’s choice between going abroad and seeking more 
importation of foreign labor, I think it would be fair to assert that, since 
the wage costs of imported labor are likely to be substantially higher than 
the wage costs of similar labor abroad, the labor importation option will 
be  outweighed by  the out-migration of  production  option unless the 
industry and the countries involved are such as to make the potential risks 
and costs of direct foreign investment unduly high. It would appear from 
casual observation that United States entrepreneurs have followed the 
direct  investment  route  h la Vernon’s PC model fairly automatically 
whereas West European entrepreneurs in technically progressive indus- 
tries have followed a mixed strategy, investing in cheap-labor countries 
abroad but also relying on increasing numbers of gmturbeiters much as in 
the “traditional,” labor-intensive industries of section 6.2. It may well be 
that the greater willingness of  West European governments to increase 
importation of garturbeiters in the 1960s and much of  the 1970s and the 
relative  stringency of  United  States immigration policy in  regard to 
unskilled labor account for this differential.  Whether domestic labor 
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leading to a shift from the Vernon-style direct investment abroad to 
importation of  cheap labor to the United States in the technically pro- 
gressive industries for their standardized, debugged, labor-intensive op- 
erations,  is a  question  that I cannot answer but  one that would  be 
interesting to explore. In fact, it is not at all clear that domestic labor 
would be worse off under a policy where entrepreneurs out-migrate 2 la 
the PC scenario than it would be under a policy where entrepreneurs are 
allowed to import cheaper foreign labor! 
The “Mutual Penetration of Investment” Scenario 
In contrast to the case of  PC-type  shifts in comparative advantage, I 
have earlier distinguished shifts in  comparative advantage that occur 
from increased competition from similar products, a state of affairs often 
brought  about by  R & D-induced  changes in know-how. I have also 
distinguished between two polar cases: the case in which the intensifica- 
tion of  competition does not confer an advantage to one product (and 
nation) as against another, and that in which the competitive advantage 
of one product (and nation) increases at the definite expense of the other. 
Before I proceed to analyze these two cases, however, it is necessary to 
discuss how trade in similar products comes about. 
Alternative theories of  trade in similarproducts. Recent analytical work in 
trade theory by Lancaster (1980), Dixit and Norman (1980), and Krug- 
man (1979) has undertaken formalization of the original notion, inherent 
in Linder’s (1961) pioneering work and in subsequent writings by Balassa 
(1967) and Grubel and Lloyd (1975), that much of the trade in manufac- 
tures among developed countries occurs in what might be called “similar” 
products. This formalization has proceeded on the basis of  models that 
assume identical  know-how among  different  countries  and  that  spe- 
cialization in different “similar” products ensues primarily as a result of 
scale economies, with basic indeterminacy as to which country produces 
which of the similar products and with Linder-like conclusions concern- 
ing the volume of  trade in place of  the Heckscher-Ohlin emphasis on 
predicting the pattern of trade. Therefore these theories share the Heck- 
scher-Ohlin assumption of  identical know-how but emerge with a con- 
trasting set of outcomes concerning whether the volume or the pattern of 
trade can be explained. 
On the other hand, I find it difficult to accept this type of formalization 
of trade in similar products among nation-states, neat as it is, and prefer 
an alternative “theory,” which I will sketch below with a broad brush. 
Essentially, it seems to me that if  we want to introduce the notion of 
“similar” products, with different nations trading such products to one 
another, we really have to give up the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption that 
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start with the notion that, just as in biological theorizing the “environ- 
ment” interacts with “genetic factors” to produce a phenotype, we can 
think of an economic process whereby a specific choice of a product type 
emerges within a nation-~0ciety.l~  Thus, think of the income level and the 
level of R & D in manufacturing as defining the capacity of the society to 
come up technologically with a given set of  characteristic product com- 
binations, e.g., small, medium, and large cars. 
The United States and Japan share this “genetic” set of  traits; Zaire 
and  Gabon  do not. But which  phenotype  is selected in  the market 
depends on the interaction of  this common set of genetic traits with the 
specific “environment” of  Japan and the United States. Thus the land- 
man ratios, the size and structure of  the family, etc., may lead to the 
evolution of  “gas guzzlers” in  the United States and of  smaller, fuel- 
economy cars in Japan, as, in fact, has been the case. At the next stage of 
the argument, then, the successful development of  small cars in Japan 
and of  gas guzzlers in  the United  States gets reinforced by  localized 
technical change in precisely these types of cars with the result that one is 
now dealing with a situation of  ex ante differentials in the know-how of 
producing and selling different types of cars. Next, since “cars” represent 
a generic product, representing a certain manner of  transportation, the 
taste for small cars diffuses to the United States and for gas guzzlers to 
Japan as part of the Schumpeterian process of dynamic capitalism, aided 
by advertising in search of  new markets. Thus trade in similar products 
arises. Scale economies with identical ex ante production functions do not 
play any role in this “theory,” of  course, and I believe that this scenario 
may have a greater claim to truth than the recent formal theorizations 
regarding trade in similar products.  A formal characterization of  this 
theory building on his recent theoretical work is presented in the appen- 
dix by Feenstra. 
The MPZscenario. Whether the trade in similar products arises owing to 
scale economies in the presence of ex ante identical production functions 
or because of  an “ecobiological process’’ theory like the one I have 
delineated above, what happens when the competition among similar 
products intensifies? When it results in a standoff, with the products of 
neither country’s firms gaining dominance through R & D breakthroughs 
or taste shifts (whether exogenous or advertising-induced), the response 
of the entrepreneurs is likely to be of the MPI variety if  the competition 
gets tough.ls 
Because no jobs are threatened, this then is an outcome to which 
unions ought to be indifferent. The entrepreneurs reduce the threat to 
their profits from import competition by defucto product-wise carteliza- 
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come (unless the result is the total elimination of  competition in the 
industry and the government has an antitrust policy which it seeks to 
implement to this in~tance.)’~  The results are therefore far more sanguine 
in the MPI scenario than in the PC scenario! 
The “Growing Dominance of External Products”  Scenario 
However, as soon as the comparative advantage has shifted dramati- 
cally in  favor of  the foreign products so that the domestic and foreign 
products do not both have a comfortable niche in the market, the picture 
changes drastically. 
In this case, the entrepreneurs will want protection but may settle for 
greater access to cheaper foreign labor to offset the loss of comparative 
advantage if  they can get the government to oblige them. While entre- 
preneurs may be indifferent between protection and greater access to 
foreign labor, the labor lobby will  generally prefer protection to labor 
importation for reasons which need not be spelled out again. However, 
labor may be indifferent between a policy of actual protection and one in 
which they can merely use the threat of protection to get the foreign firms 
to invest where labor is, for the policies will equally secure their jobs. On 
the other hand, the entrepreneurs will  prefer actual protection to the 
policy that merely uses protectionist threats to draw in foreign firms. For, 
while the United Auto Workers, for example, does not care whether its 
members are employed by Datsun or Ford, Ford does! 
Thus we have the intriguing response possibility of  domestic labor 
trying to import foreign entrepreneurs (with superior know-how), where- 
as in the “traditional” industries (of section 6.2) we had the spectacle of 
domestic entrepreneurs trying to import foreign labor (which will imply 
lower wages)! 
As it happens, the protectionist threat resulting from the deteriorating 
competitive position of  the  United States car industry is  a splendid 
example of the scenarios spelled out above. The American car industry, 
thanks largely to the steady erosion of  the market for gas guzzlers in 
recent years, has been turning increasingly to producing small cars for 
survival, and this has shifted the problem of competition from one where 
the makers of American and foreign cars each had their own special niche 
in the market, with MPI (and variants thereof in the form of  mutually 
supportive and profitable arrangements for marketing, joint production, 
etc.) as the relevant model, to one where the competition is more fierce 
and over a product type (the small car) where the makers of foreign cars 
have always had the edge. The result has been indeed for labor unions to 
go abroad and threaten the makers of  foreign cars to produce in  the 
United States or face protection. The following New York Times reports 
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Douglas A. Fraser, head of  the United Automobile Workers union, 
warned  Japanese  car  makers  today  that  they  must  invest in  auto 
assembly plants in the United States or face the threat of  immediate 
legislation to restrict rising imports of  their small fuel-efficient cars. 
He told  Prime  Minister  Masayoshi Ohira  and  Foreign Minister 
Saburo Okita at separate meetings today that 220,000 auto workers 
were  unemployed  in  the United  States and that  there was  a  10.3 
percent unemployment rate in Michigan, his home state and the center 
of  American auto industry. Japanese auto makers should open opera- 
tions in the United States to reduce unemployment there, even if  only 
by  small amounts, Mr. Fraser said. “You ought to have a sense of 
urgency,”  Mr. Fraser said he had told the Japanese leaders. He is 
making a short trip to Japan at the suggestion of  Mike Mansfield, the 
United States Ambassador. 
American vehicle imports totaled 2.2 million units in 1979, including 
about 1.7 million cars, and shipments in 1980 may increase as Amer- 
icans turn to light, front-wheel-drive Japanese cars. By contrast, Japan 
imported fewer than 20,000 American cars last year. 
The tall,  heavily  built  U.A.W.  chief  said that  Nissan Motor, a 
leading auto maker here that markets Datsun cars, offered yesterday to 
build a truck assembly plant in the United States, to avoid a pending 25 
percent import tariff. 
“That  won’t be  sufficient,” Mr.  Fraser  said.  (New  York  Times. 
1980~) 
A stiff Congressional warning went out to Japan today to cut back 
voluntarily on automobile exports to the United States or face protec- 
tionist quota legislation that would damage the trading interests of both 
countries. 
The chairman of  a House trade sub-committee, Charles A. Vanik, 
Democrat of Ohio, called on the Japanese to roll back their American 
exports to 1977 levels over a two-year period to avoid what he called 
the “last resort” of legislated quotas. 
In addition, he said, underscoring recent demands by Douglas A. 
Fraser, president of  the United Automobile Workers, the Japanese 
must be convinced of the necessity to build important quantities of cars 
in the United States to avoid protectionist reaction here. 
Declining international values for the yen, which  make it more 
profitable to export from Japan, and the current emphasis on produc- 
ing competing small cars by  the American industry are behind the 
resistance of  the two biggest Japanese producer-Toyoto  and Nis- 
san-to  construct assembly  plants in the country. But Honda, a smaller 
company, has announced plans to manufacture relatively modest num- 
bers of  cars in an assembly plant in Ohio. 
Mr. Vanik’s call for voluntary restraint, made at committee hearings 
crowded today with Japanese reporters, came shortly after two bills 
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But Congressional analysts believe that sentiment is not yet ready to 
jell, though it well might if  automotive unemployment continues to 
rise. More than 200,000 auto workers have already been laid off. 
At 1977 levels, Japanese sales here would be some 25 percent below 
the current rate of 2 million cars a year, which represents well over 20 
percent of  all cars sold in the United States. 
No other country permits such penetration, Fred G. Secrest, execu- 
tive vice president of  the Ford Motor Company, told the panel. 
He reported that, by agreement between British and Japanese pro- 
ducer associations, Japanese imports into Britain were held to about 11 
percent of  the market. France, he said, applies an informal but very 
effective share limit of  3 percent to Japanese cars. By bilateral agree- 
ment, Italy limits Japanese imports to 2,000 cars and trucks, while 
Spain limits imports of  automobiles to a value of  $500,000 from any 
exporting country. 
Thomas J. Downey, Democrat of  Suffolk County, said that Amer- 
ican consumers were welcoming Japanese products “with open arms” 
and that even during the committee proceedings news photographs 
were being made by Nikon cameras and voice recordings by Panasonic. 
He warned that failure to cut back the flow of  Japanese cars would 
mean “a wave of protectionism that will sweep across the country and 
do irreparable harm to the Japanese economy and ultimately to us.” 
(New York Times,  1980c) 
The reaction to this protectionist lobbying by  Japanese car makers is 
likely to be a response which combines some voluntary export restraints 
(VERs) and some accommodation to the demands for direct investment 
in the United States either h la Honda in Ohio or  in some joint ventures in 
the United States with United States car makers like the proposed deal in 
Italy between Alfa Romeo, the state-owned car maker, and Nissan, 
which produces the Datsun, to  produce a new medium-sized  car at Alfa’s 
plant in Alfasud in Pamigliano, Naples, with Alfa engines and Nissan 
bodies.” 
6.4  Concluding Remarks 
The primary emphasis of  this paper has been to examine the strong 
relationship that exists between the response to intensifying  import com- 
petition in goods and the nature of international labor and entrepreneu- 
rial mobility. In doing this, the paper has sought to provide a framework 
to systematize alternative patterns of  responses to shifts in comparative 
advantage, without undertaking a rigorous, theoretical formulation of 
many of  the ideas set forth. 
Perhaps the major analytical limitation of  the paper is the lack of 
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nation is governed. Whether, for example, the importation of  foreign 
labor is legal, as in Western Europe, or illegal, as in the United States, 
and whether the unions are successful in their bid for protection instead 
of  permitting  a  market-oriented  adjustment  to shifting comparative 
advantage are issues that require an analysis of  how the corporate state 
works, i.e., how representative  democracy interacts with industry and 
labor.  Such  a  “political”  and  public-choice-theoretic analysis would 
nicely complement  the  analysis I have  set forth here, essentially by 
explaining cross-country contrasts in the choices of policy response that 
have actually occurred as comparative advantage has shifted in recent 
years. 
Notes 
1. The only important exception to this hypothesis (i.e., that in the declining, senescent, 
unprogressive,  labor-intensive  industries  the  typical response would  not  be  for entre- 
preneurs to move) would appear to come from Japanese experience. However, the shift of 
some Japanese textiles, for example, to South Korea and other countries in the Far East 
appears to have been partly a question of “investment shunting” prompted by GSP. It may 
also be useful to examine whether the shift has occurred from the technologically more 
progressive firms among these industries. Again, the few United States apparel producers 
who have gone abroad to take advantage of  United States tariff provisions under GSP or 
806.30-807 (the offshore assembly provision)  seem to be the smaller firms with special 
designing or marketing skills. For a discussion of how Japanese direct investment differs in 
this respect (i.e., insofar as it occurs also in the “traditional”  labor-intensive industries) 
from Western direct investment, see Kojima (1978). 
2.  In fact, the reward to capital is higher at Q2  and Q3  under the labor-importation policy 
and thus should please entrepreneurs more. 
3.  Note that, even if  a production subsidy were used for protection, the corresponding 
welfare (Ups)  would, while avoiding the consumption cost of  the tariff, still be inferior to 
that under the policy of  relaxing the immigration restrictions on labor. 
4.  Note that the real rewards at Q,  and Q3 are identical, since the goods price ratio does 
not change along a Rybczynski line. 
5. This strong ranking would not have followed if the policy comparison had not required 
identical Yo production. Thus it is easy to see in figure 6.3 that further shifts up along the 
Rybczynski line and hence IC (Pp)  could lead eventually to welfare levels below that at C,. 
Note also that the strong ranking might not hold if we were to use a sticky-wage model of 
either the Brecher (1974a, b)  or the Harris and Todaro (1970) variety since that would 
introduce a domestic distortion in the sense of Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), Johnson 
(1965), and Bhagwati (1971). 
6. Types of factor accumulation or technological progress which can lead to an increase in 
the production of the exportable good X and a fall in the production of  Yare as follows: an 
increase in the stock of  capital (used intensively in the export industry), and neutral or 
labor-using technological progress in the export industry (see Findlay and Grubert 1959). 
7. It is a  moot  point  whether  labor  is, in fact,  always more  mobile  than  capital is 
malleable! 
8. The analysis of this model and the next could be extended to cases where the shift in 
comparative advantage is domestically induced, as in cases I11 and IV above. This can be 
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9. Note that the output of the importable industry expands under apolicy of protection or 
labor importation. 
10. The production is, of  course, identical under both options; i.e., both policies are 
assumed to take the economy back to Q,.  However, under the labor-importation option, 
the net-of-remuneration-for-foreign-workers  “production”  point is Q3 (<Q,). 
11. The project at Sussex University’s Center for European Studies under the direction 
of  Professor Ronald Dore ought to shed more light on these questions. 
12.  In chapter 9 of this volume, the analysis considers the lobbying costs of  the labor 
lobby as well. 
13. If  we could raise any amount of revenue in a lump-sum fashion, it would of course be 
trivially true that we could bribe the labor lobby out of  any protectionist pressure! The 
notion of  the efficient tariff, on the other hand, is a second-best one, and the beauty of  it is 
that the revenue being used for the bribe to labor is generated by the tariff itself. For further 
discussion, see chapter 9. 
14. In the standard 2 x 2 x 2 model, it is possible to work out the conditions under which 
the paradox of  welfare-worsening tariff imposition will arise. See Bhagwati and Rivera- 
Batiz (1980). This paradox was first noted in Bhagwati (1979). 
15. Needless to say, varying the tax on foreign capital to its optimal level would eliminate 
the paradox. This is, however, as removed from reality as differential taxation of  foreign 
labor in the argument in the text and in Bhagwati and Rivera-Batiz  (1980). 
16. Of course, it is easy enough to construct analytical cases where the shift outward of 
technology-cum-capital, by profit-maximizing entrepreneurs, neither increases domestic 
unemployment  in  a  Brecher-type  model  nor  lowers the real  wages of  labor  with full 
employment in the 2 x 2 X 2 model. 
17. Thus a typical popularized statement of  the modern genetic theory is the following: 
“The phenotype is the result of a particular heredity acting on a particular environmental 
background. Any variation we observe among the members of a related group of organisms 
living under natural conditions must be phenotypic variation, because it will be the result of 
different environmental pressures and different genetic histories. Phenotypic variation in a 
population is the sum of  genotypic variation inherent in the combined heredity of the group 
plus that part of  the environmental variation which affects the phenotype”  (Alland, Jr., 
1972, p. 9). 
18. Impure forms of  the MPI phenomenon may involve a one-way equity purchase in 
exchange for marketing facilities. 
19. Governments, of course, manage to get worried about direct foreign investments for 
all sorts of  reasons; so perhaps I ought not to be overly optimistic about their benign neglect 
in this case! 
20.  However, the foreign investment response, as already indicated, may not meet with 
the approval of  the entrepreneurs in the Honda type of  investment or with that of  the 
entrepreneurs other than  the  one going into joint  venture  in the  Alfa-Nissan  type of 
investment. In fact, as the New York Times (19806) reported on the Alfa-Nissan proposal: 
“Fiat, not surprisingly, reacted strongly against the proposal, charging that the Nissan deal 
could become the opening wedge for a Japanese invasion of the Italian automobile market. 
Fiat, auto industry experts say, is particularly vulnerable to fresh competition because it has 
been losing some of  its market share to other European car makers.  . . . 
“Fiat is also beset by sabotage and work stoppages by its workers. The company says that 
the violence and wildcat strikes caused a 12 percent decline in production last year and 
pushed its operating costs up sharply. 
“To head off the Nissan-Alfa venture, Fiat made a proposal of  its own to Alfa early this 
month, offering to buy 40,000  to 50,000 Alfa engines-the  same number that would be 
involved in the Nissan deal-and  mount them on new flat models over the next several 
years. There has also been talk about possible construction of  a new Fiat body factory near 
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Trade unions, if organized by firms, may also then have conflicting interests; and differen- 
tial location of  different firms may also pose questions of conflicting interests, e.g., workers 
in Alfa Romeo versus workers in Fiat. 
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Appendix  Product  Creation  and  Trade  Patterns: A  Theoretical 
Note on the  “Biological”  Model  of Trade in  Similar 
Products 
Robert C. Feenstra 
Introduction 
In this appendix I shall draw on the recent research of Feenstra (1980) 
to formalize the “biological” model of trade in similar products outlined 
by  Bhagwati in  this chapter.’ The main features of  the model to be 
presented are as follows: (1) As in models of  “learning by  doing” (see 
Arrow  1962) or induced technological innovation (see Kennedy 1964; 
Samuelson 1965), the technologies available within a country are endoge- 
nously determined by tastes, research and development (R & D) costs, 
and other parameters. (2) The returns to R & D activity are the monopoly 
profits associated with developing and marketing a new product, and an 
equilibrium of  the R & D process is determined as a Chamberlinian 
“tangency solution” where profits on the last R & D project are zero. (3) 
If  we allow countries to reach an R & D equilibrium in autarky, then it 
follows from (1) and (2) that countries with differing tastes, R & D costs, 
etc., will have different sets of  available products and technologies. We 
shall assume that technological knowledge cannot be transferred abroad. 
Then opening the countries to international trade, we may observe trade 
in  “similar”  products  arising from the fact that  some countries may 
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produce unique varieties of  a differentiated product, and therefore ex- 
port these varieties and import others. This bilateral trade in  similar 
products, or intraindustry trade, is not related to scale economies in the 
post-R  & D technologies (which are assumed to exhibit constant returns 
to  scale), but, rather, depends on differences in the post-R  & D technolo- 
gies across countries and therefore, from (l), on cross-country differ- 
ences in tastes, R & D costs, and other parameters. 
It can be seen from this brief outline that our model is closely related to 
the ideas sketched by Bhagwati, and offers an alternative explanation for 
trade in similar products from the models of  monopolistic competition 
and trade given in, among others, Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980), 
and in these authors’ contributions to this volume. In the next section we 
shall present our model in detail and show how the autarky equilibrium is 
established. The pattern of trade between two countries is analyzed in the 
third section. In the last section we  contrast our results to those from 
models of  monopolistic competition and trade, and give brief conclu- 
sions. 
Autarky Equilibrium 
where the aggregate demand for product (i.e., variety) i is given by 
We shall consider the group of markets for a differentiated product, 
(All  qi = aid’(p,  I;  S (t)  ) , 
where p  is  the vector  of  prices, I is total consumer income, ai is a 
parameter reflecting tastes for different varieties, and S(t)  denotes the set 
of  products which are currently available for purchase and which change 
over time due to R & D. It is assumed that the demand functions d’ 
correspond to a symmetric utility function.* It is also assumed that de- 
mand  is homogeneous of  degree one in  income and negative one in 
prices, and that goods are substitutes in the sense that an expansion in the 
set S(t)  of goods available implies a fall (or no change) in the demand for 
any good previously a~ailable.~ 
Note that the aggregate demand functions given in (Al)  can be aggre- 
gated from individual demand functions under either of  the following 
conditions: (1) all consumers have identical homothetic utility functions, 
in which case the parameters ai, reflecting tastes for different varieties, 
are identical across consumers;  (2) the distribution of  income across 
consumers is fixed, and the individual utility functions are homothetic 
and differ only in the parameters ai, in which case the aggregate  pa- 
rameters ui reflect diflerences across individuals in their tastes for dif- 
ferent ~arieties.~ 
We shall model an R & D project as spending fixed costs off to 
discover the technology to produce good i.  It is assumed that the post-R 
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before the R & D takes place: this assumption is made for simplicity, but 
may not be unrealistic in situations where, prior to R & D, one has an 
accurate estimate of the inputs needed to produce a good even though the 
manner in which the inputs will be combined (i.e., the design of  the 
product) is unknown. The post-R  & D technologies are assumed to be 
linearly homogeneous, and the factor prices which determine c, are held 
constant throughout the analysis. If  the fixed costs 7 of  R & D  are 
stochastic, then f  denotes the certainty equivalent of 7.' We shall assume 
that after the technology for producing any particular good is known, no 
further R & D on this good takes place; our model is thus one of product 
creation rather than process innovation on the technologies of  existing 
goods. 
In general terms, the R & D process we wish to model is one in which R 
& D proceeds sequentially over different products, where private firms 
decide which products to develop and when to stop creating new goods. It 
will be convenient to assume that, at any point in time when R & D is 
occurring, only one product (and corresponding technology) is being 
developed, and only one firm is engaged in this R & D. We shall suppose 
that the knowledge embodied in any new technology is protected by a 
one-period patent and that after the patent expires this knowledge is fully 
appropriable by  all firms in the domestic (but not foreign) market. It 
follows that the returns to creating a new product through R & D are 
simply the one-period monopoly profits associated with the product: 
(A24 
where pr denotes the profit-maximizing  price (where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost), p* is the corresponding vector of  prices, and the 
notation S(t)  U  {i}  denotes the set obtained by adding product i to the set 
of products S(t)  previously available for purchase. 
After a patent expires and other firms begin production of that good, it 
is assumed that the market structure is perfectly competitive, so that the 
good is sold at its marginal (and average) cost of  c,. Thus the prices pi in 
the vector'p* are determined as follows: 
ni(S(t))  = (pT -  ci)aid'(p*,I;S(t)U{i})  -f, 
for j  C S(t) 
1  +m  forj  f S(t) and j # i, 
where e, denotes the elasticity of  demand for product i, e, > 1, and we 
adopt the convention of setting prices equal to +  ~0 for products which are 
not available for purchase. The monopolistic equilibrium given in (A2a, 
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To complete our model, we must specify how R & D proceeds over 
time, that is, how the set of  products S(t)  available for purchase at the 
competitive price changes. Loosely speaking, we shall assume that start- 
ing from any set of initial products So, R & D occurs on the product of 
highest profitability and then proceeds sequentially (i.e., one good at a 
time) to the products next highest in the rank order of  profitability, 
stopping when the remaining profits are nonpositive. This description is 
not precise, since it is possible for the rank order of products by profitabil- 
ity to depend on the set of  goods S(r), and therefore the rank ordering 
can change over time. 
More formally, given any set of products S(t)  available for purchase at 
the competitive price, we shall assume that the next product selected for 
development is i*,  which satisfies 
lli*(S(t))  = max II,(S(t)). 
ips@) 
If  more than one product i* satisfies (A3), any one can be selected. Let 
A(t) denote the length of time between the introduction (availability) of 
the last, and next, product sold at its competitive price. We shall assume 
that A(t)  is inversely related to the current profitability of  R & D: 
(A44  A(t) = l/+(&*(S(t))), 
where 
(A4b)  +(x) = 0  forxlO, 
forx >  0.  +’  (x)  >  0 
Finally, note that the set of products S(t)  available for purchase at the 
competitive price changes in the following manner: 
645)  S(r + A(t))  = S(t)U{i*},  trO 
S(t)  = So,  Ost<A(O), 
where the set So of  initial products is given and nonempty. Equations 
(A2)-(A5)  are a complete description of  our R & D process.6 
From  (A4) we  see that  as the profitability of  the most  attractive 
remaining R & D project falls, the length of  time A(t)  between the 
introduction of  new products increases, and when Hi. 5  0, then A(t)  = 
+  03  in which case no further R & D takes place and we shall say that the 
set S  (f)  of available products has converged.’ We shall refer to  the set  of 
available products and the associated competitive prices as an autarky 
equilibrium of  the R & D process. 
What products do we expect to be produced in the autarky equilibrium 
(i.e.,  included in the set s)?  Clearly, those products which are most 188  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
profitable-which  have a high  ai  or low  cz-will  be produced. Thus, 
suppose that ci  = c for all i so that products differ only in the demand 
parameter ai. We can rank-order products from the highest to lowest ai, 
and this clearly corresponds to the rank ordering by  profitability and is 
invariant to the set S(t)  of  goods produced. Then R & D will begin at the 
product with highest ai  and proceed down the rank ordering, stopping 
when the profits from R & D become nonpositive. Similarly, if ai = a for 
all i and products differ only in their unit costs ci,  then the rank ordering 
of products from lowest to highest ci  corresponds to the rank ordering by 
profitability and is invariant to the set of  goods produced, and R & D will 
begin at the product with lowest ci  and proceed along the rank ordering 
until the profits from R & D are nonpositive. 
For given demand parameters ai  and unit costs ci,  the number of goods 
produced in the autarky equilibrium is determined by  total consumer 
income land  the fixed R & D costsf. From our assumption that goods are 
substitutes, an increase in the number of products (i.e., an expansion of 
S(t))  lowers the returns to R & D on any remaining product. A rise in 
consumer income or fall in fixed costs of R & D increases the profits from 
R & D, and therefore expands the number of  goods produced in the 
autarky equilibrium.8 
To make explicit the relationship between our formalization and the 
“biological” model of  trade in similar products outlined by  Bhagwati, 
note  that we  can identify the total consumer income I spent on all 
varieties of  the differentiated product, and the fixed costs of  R & D, as 
“genetic” traits defining the capacity of  an economy to create products 
through R & D. Given countries with similar “genetic” traits, the actual 
set of product varieties developed (i.e., phenotype selected) depends on 
the interaction between this common set of  genetic traits and the specific 
“environment” of a country, where we identify the demand parameters ui 
and post-R  & D unit costs ci  as determined by the environment (e.g., 
factor endowments; transportation and communication infrastructure, 
including advertising; social habits) of a country. We have seen that slight 
differences in the environmental parameters may lead to marked differ- 
ences in the set of  product varieties developed in autarky, and thus a 
situation of  technological differentials across countries in the production 
of  different  varietie~.~  These cross-country differences in  the sets of 
products developed in autarky will lead to  trade in similar products, as we 
shall analyze in the following section. 
Trade Equilibrium 
We shall consider trade between two countries A and B, where it is 
assumed that the functions d‘ in (Al) are identical in the two countries so 
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also differ in consumer income I, unit costs ci, or fixed R & D costs f, 
which are measured in terms of a common numeraire in the two countries 
and are denoted with a superscript A or B. Note that given any set S(t)  of 
products available in both countries, the world demand for product i is 
(A6)  atd' (p,  P  ;  S (t  ) ) + a"i(p,  IS;  S (t)  ) 
= (aAP + a"B)d'(p,  l;S(t)), 
since the demand functions d are homogeneous of degree one in income. 
The sets SA(t) and S"(t)  denote those products which have been de- 
veloped in countries A and B, respectively, and the set S(t) of  goods 
available in both countries with trade is given by S(t)  = SA(t) U SB(t). 
Because of  the dynamic nature of  our R & D process, in order to 
determine the set of  products available in a trade equilibrium we must 
specify the timing of trade liberalization. Accordingly, we shall assume 
that each of  the two countries  A and B reaches an autarky equilibrium SA 
and SB,  respectively, and that trade is opened only after the autarky 
equilibria have been established. This assumption corresponds to the 
empirical observation that firms usually develop new products for the 
home market before considering export possibilities, and can be justified 
on the basis of  various forms of  uncertainty when marketing products 
abroad. We shall also assume that technologies cannot be transferred 
internationally, so that if  firms in any country wish to produce a good 
which is not yet produced at home (but may be available through trade), 
they must first develop the technology through R & D.Io 
Within our model, the trade equilibrium is determined in the following 
manner. After the opening of trade, the profits from R & D activity are 
evaluated using world rather than domestic demand so that, from (A2a) 
and (A6), the returns to R & D on product i are given by 
(A2a')  nf  (S (t  ) ) = (p: -  cf )  (afZA  +  af?P)di  (p  * ,I ;  S (t  )  U{i}) 
-  fk,k=A,B, 
where at the time  T when trade is opened the set S(t) of  products 
available in both countries is S(t) = SA  U  SB. 
Note that in general R & D in one country may occur in goods which 
are already produced abroad, where this product imitation may be profit- 
able if one country has a sufficient cost advantage in production over the 
other country. However, if  countries have similar post-R  & D unit costs 
(measured in terms of a common numeraire), then product imitation is 
unlikely to occur, and we shall assume that this is the case. It follows that 
in (A2a') product i is not included in the set of products already available 
for purchase (i i!  S(t) = SA (t) U S"(t)) and that the vector of pricesp* is 
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(A2b’) 
~min{cf,c~}  forjCSA(t)nSE(t) 
Ci”  forjCSA(t),j$S”(t) 
Ci”  for j c ~”(t),  j  6  SA  (t) 
forj  =  i and when evaluating 
for j  @ S(t) and j # i. 
“ [A]  nf,k=A,B 
I  +m 
In this specification of p* it is recognized that for products which have 
been developed in both countries (j  C  SA (t) n  S”(t)), production and 
export will take place in the country of  minimum unit cost and competi- 
tive price. 
Turning to the dynamics of  R & D, we shall assume in general that, 
after the opening of trade, R & D will occur in a country if  and only if the 
monopoly profits from R & D as given in (A29 are positive for some 
product. When the maximum profits over all remaining products are 
nonpositive in both countries, then the sets SA (t), S”(t), and S(t),  of the 
R & D process will have converged to some sets SA, ?”,  and ? = iA  U g”, 
respectively, and we shall refer to these sets of products developed and 
available, and the associated competitive prices, as a trade equilibrium of 
the R & D process.11 
While it is difficult to specify a general set of equations governing the R 
& D process with trade, one can easily describe certain special cases. For 
example, suppose that the countries “take turns” in R & D in the sense 
that the first country-say, country A-engages in R & D in a manner 
analogous to the autarky process until the profits (as given in [A2’])  from 
remaining R & D activity are nonpositive, after which country B develops 
products sequentially until profitable R & D opportunities have been 
exhausted. From our assumption that goods are substitutes, this process 
will converge after the two “turns” we have indicated, since the introduc- 
tion of  new products by country B will lower the profits from R & D 
activity in country A. 
As another example, suppose that the time intervals AA(t)  and A”([) 
between the introduction of the last, and next, product sold at its com- 
petitive price are equal and constant in both countries whenever profits 
from R & D are positive; that is, 
where ii  satisfies 
ni(S(t))  = max IIf(S(t)),  k =  A,B. 
ips(0 
Then the change in the set of products S(t)  available for purchase at the 
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(A5 ')  S(t)  = SA(t)USB(t), 
sk  (t)  u  {Q}  if II;  >  o 
if nt  I  0, 
Sk(t + Z) = 
Sk(t)  = sk  for  Tit<  T + &k=A,B. 
tr  T, 
'k 
In this case the R & D process with trade is completely described by 
(A2')-(A5'),  and is assumed to converge to a trade equilibrium. 
What trade patterns do we expect to observe in a trade equilibrium? 
First, let us consider the pattern of trade which emerges in the temporary 
competitive equilibrium immediately following the opening of trade, but 
before any additional R & D has occurred. Suppose that the sets sA and  sB  of  products developed in countries A and B, respectively, have no 
products in common, where the difference between these sets may be 
attributed to differing demand parameters u;"  and post-R  & D unit costs 
in the two countries, k =  A,B,  which leads to different products being 
developed in autarky (e.g., small and big  cars, different varieties of 
furniture, etc.). In this equilibrium, all products in the set sA  will clearly 
be exported from country A to country B,  and conversely for products in 
the set 3'.  The volume of  exports from one country to the other is 
determined by the number of goods the exporting country produces (i.e., 
in sk),  where for given tastes and post-R  & D unit costs, the number of 
goods produced  in the autarky equilibrium is directly related to total 
consumer income Zk  and inversely related to the fixed costs of R & Dfk, 
k=A,B. 
More generally, suppose that the sets sA  and sB  of products developed 
have some goods in common. For these goods, production and export in 
the temporary equilibrium will take place in the country of minimum unit 
cost and competitive price, while for goods developed in only one coun- 
try, the trade pattern is determined as before. In this case the volume of 
trade  depends on the relative  unit  costs of  production  between  the 
countries, since the country with a cost advantage in the larger number of 
products will tend in aggregate to be a net exporter of those products both 
countries have developed. 
Do we expect to observe additional R & D after trade is opened to 
move the economies away from the temporary equilibrium we have just 
described? Such R & D will occur if  and only if  the evaluation of profits 
from R & D is changed from nonpositive to positive as a result of using 
world rather than domestic demand (i.e., shifting from [A21  to [A2']). 
This shift in demand has two effects on profits: (1) profits are increased 
due to the expansion of market income, that is, evaluating profits usingZA 
+ ZB  rather than ZA  or ZB; (2) profits are decreased due to the greater 
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S(  T)  = sA  U sB  rather than sA  or sB.  It is quite possible for effect (2) to 
dominate effect (1) so that there is no additional R & D after trade is 
opened, and the temporary equilibrium which we have just analyzed is 
identical to the trade equilibrium. 
In fact, the following result can be established.’’  Suppose that demand 
and unit costs of production are identical across products and countries, 
at  =  a?  = a and ct  =cf =  c for all  i, that ,as more products are intro- 
duced goods become stronger substitutes, that the sets of goods sA  and sB 
produced in each country in the autarky equilibrium have no products in 
common, and that the number of goods produced in each country in the 
autarky equilibrium is large.  Then after trade is opened there is  no 
additional R & D activity. By continuity, we can allow slight differences 
in the demand parameters a:  and cf  across commodities and countries, 
k = A ,B,  and under the remaining hypotheses still find that the amount of 
R & D activity after trade (if any) is small. The difference between the 
sets sA  and sB  of products developed in autarky is now determined by 
cross-country differences in tastes and post-R  & D unit costs (as well as 
differences in total consumer income and fixed costs of R & D), and the 
implications for trade patterns are as previously described: products in sA 
will be exported to country B, and conversely. We have thus arrived at 
the model of trade in “similar” products outlined in the introduction to 
this appendix and a formalization of  the ideas sketched by Bhagwati. 
Last, we must consider the case where additional R & D activity does 
occur after the opening of  trade. The products which  firms in  each 
country select to develop need not be identical across countries, though 
identical rank orderings by profitability will obtain if  the post-R  & D unit 
costs of production are equal in the two countries. In general we expect 
the rate of product creation in each country to depend on the profits from 
R & D, which may differ across countries due to different unit costs of 
production or fixed costs of R & D, and some exogenously specified “rate 
of product creation” function (or parameter) such as  in (A4) (or A  in 
[A4’]). Countries with a quicker rate of  product creation will tend in 
aggregate to be a net exporter of  those products which are developed 
after trade is opened. 
Conclusions 
A general conclusion from models of  monopolistic competition and 
trade, such as Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980), is that the volume 
of trade between countries is determined in the trade equilibrium, but the 
geographical origin of any particular product is indeterminate; the latter 
result follows since countries are assumed to have identical technologies. 
The above model of product creation differs in several respects. First, the 
geographical origin of  production is determinate for any good which is 
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to occur whenever one country has a demand bias or cost advantage in 
certain product varieties while the other country has a demand bias or 
cost advantage in other varieties. In particular, countries will tend to 
export those products which are developed in autarky.I3  The resulting 
intraindustry trade is not related to scale economies in the post-R  & D 
technologies, but, rather, is determined by scale economies (due to the 
spreading of fixed costs) of R & D and cross-country differences in tastes, 
post-R  & D unit costs, etc. Note that for goods which are developed in 
both countries, the location of  production is indeterminate if  the post-R 
& D unit costs are identical. 
The volume of  trade in any particular product is determined by the 
number of  goods produced, and, as in models of  monopolistic competi- 
tion, this number is established in a Chamberlinian “tangency solution” 
and is directly related to total consumer income and inversely related to 
the fixed costs of production or R & D.I4  For the case where additional R 
& D activity occurs after the opening of  trade, the aggregate volume of 
trade in equilibrium is determined by the rates of product creation in the 
two countries, whereas this effect does not enter the models of monopo- 
listic competition and trade (which are primarily of  a static nature). 
In conclusion, we should indicate that the model of  product creation 
we have presented can be fruitfully extended in a wide variety of  direc- 
tions (see Feenstra 1980), e.g., modeling “product imitation”  by  one 
country to lead to a model of the “product cycle”, or an examination of 
the Linder  (1961) hypotheses concerning the importance of  domestic 
demand in determining potential and actual trade. 
Notes 
1. This  formalization  demonstrates how  the  “biological  model”  of  trade in  similar 
products can be cast in theoretical terms, but is incomplete in that certain aspects of the 
proposed model are not fully investigated. 
2. In order to correspond to a symmerric utility function, the demand functions d’ must 
satisfy the following condition: if the vectorp is equal top  except that the componentsp, and 
p,  have been interchanged,  then 
d’(p,I;S(t))  = d(p”,l;S(t)). 
An example of  a utility function leading to demand equations as in (Al) is 
N 
,=1  U=  ,X  aiv(qi/ai),  v’>O,v”<O. 
The corresponding demand functions are 
qi  = a, 4 (AP, 1, 
where + is the inverse function of  v’ and A is the marginal utility of  income 
S’, we have  3. That is, for i E S and S 
d’ (p.  I;  S’) 5  d’ (p,  I;  S). 194  Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
4.  Lancaster (1980) assumes that each consumer has a most preferred product variety, 
that demand for neighboring varieties decreases in a uniform manner, and that the distribu- 
tion  of  consumers'  preferred varieties is  also uniform  across products,  in which case 
aggregate demand is identical across product varieties. 
5. If2rms evaluate profits using the utility function U,  an approximate certainty equiva- 
lent to  f  is given by 
1  f=?+-u;RA,  2 
where?=  E(7),  u;  = E(7 -  ?)2, and RA = -  U'//u'  is the index of absolute risk aversion. 
6. I have permitted myself one sleight of  hand in specifying the equations for the R & D 
process. Specifically, given equation (A4), it would be natural to let A(?) denote the length 
of  time between the introduction of  the last, and next, product sold at its monopolistic 
(rather than competitive) price. However, this definition would complicate the specification 
ofp'  in (A2b) since, depending on  the length of  time needed to complete the R & D for one 
product, at any point in time a variable number of products are sold at their monopolistic 
price. Because of this complication, we have adopted the simpler, but less natural, defini- 
tion of  A (t). 
7.  We shall assume that convergence is obtained; that is, the R & D eventually stops. This 
seems to be a reasonable assumption of  a market where total demand is stationary (i.e., 
consumer income I  is fixed) and the introduction of new goods does not affect the demand or 
cost parameters ai,  c,, and fi. 
8. But note that, starting from an autarky equilibrium, a fall in I  or rise inf has no effect 
on the  set 3 of  available products:  these parameter changes decrease the profits from 
remaining R & D projects and also decrease the hypothetical profits from duplicating the R 
& D activity on  any existing product (and hypothetically selling the product at its monopoly 
price for one period), but neither of these outcomes has any effect on the set of products 
available. This illustrates a basic difference between our model and models of  monopolistic 
competition: in the model being presented the set of  products available can expand but 
never contract, since the fixed costs of  R & D are borne in only one period, whereas in 
models of  monopolistic competition where fixed costs are paid every period, the number of 
products available can expand or contract as a result of parameter changes. However, if we 
compare two different economies which are identical except that the first has lower con- 
sumer income or higher fixed costs of  R & D than the second and these parameters have not 
changed over time, then in their autarky equilibria the first economy will have a smaller 
number of  products available than the second. 
9.  Note that even if  the demand parameters  ai  and unit costs  ci  are identical across 
commodities, in which case any undeveloped product satisfies (A3) and may be selected for 
development, we may still obtain cross-country differences in the sets of products developed 
in autarky due to random differences in the products selected for R & D. If  the number of 
potential product varieties is large relative to the number actually developed, this random 
selection procedure will  probably  lead  to little overlap  across countries  in  the sets of 
products developed in autarky, and therefore to a considerable amount of  trade in these 
similar products (as analyzed in the next section). 
10. That is, in the model being presented we shall assume that the fixed costs of R & D in 
any country do not depend on whether the product has previously been developed abroad. 
In some cases it may be more realistic to assume that the additional fixed costs of adapting a 
foreign technology for production at home are considerably less than if the technology had 
not been developed abroad, and our model can be extended in this direction (see Feenstra 
1980). 
11. Note that our analysis is partial equilibrium, and we do not require that trade is 
balanced in the trade equilibrium. 
12. A similar result, using a CES utility function, is established in Feenstra (1980). 195  Shifting Advantage, Protectionist Demands, and Policy Response 
13. Note that in the models of  Krugman  and Lancaster it is assumed that aggregate 
demand and production costs are identical across goods. If  we adopted this assumption 
within our model, then we would not be able to predict which goods would be developed in 
autarky (as  discussed in note 9),  though it would still be the case that countries would tend to 
export the autarky set of  products. On the other hand, if  we weakened the “symmetry” 
assumption of  identical aggregate demand and production costs within Lancaster’s model, 
but retained the assumption that countries have identical technologies and factor prices, 
then we would still find that the geographical origin of  production is indeterminate  (in 
contrast  to the  model  of  product  creation). The “symmetry”  assumption  cannot  be 
weakened within Krugman’s model, since this would lead to the nonexistence of a long-run 
equilibrium with zero profits for every firm in the industry; this existence problem may be 
recognized  as a weakness of the Chamberlinian  approach to monopolistic competition 
theory, as also discussed by Chipman in his comment to chapter 7. 
14. A difference in the determination  of the number of  goods produced between our 
model and that of  monopolistic competition is discussed in note 8. 
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